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American philosopher Jacob Needleman once noted, “we live in a time of 
metaphysical repression and this repression must be lifted.”1  Symptomatic of 
this repression is the reduction of nature from physis to mere 'environment', 
about which he opines, “one cannot stand in wonder in front of the 
environment, one can only worry.”2  Were he seeking an able pair of hands to 
aid in the lifting of this repression, he might well look to those of Australian 
ecophilosopher Freya Mathews, whose book, For Love of Matter: A 
Contemporary Panpsychism  (2003, SUNY Press) aims a dart to the heart of this 
repression.  Mathews adds that the environment is not something we can 
encounter in a fully personal way either, it betokens a world that has been 
rendered mere backdrop, rather than the lodestar for human meanings and 
purposes.3  To breathe life back into the corpse that modern metaphysical 
repression has made of nature will require nothing less than a “metaphysics of 
reanimation”4 of a panpsychist bent that can allow again for enchanted 
encounter to occur. 
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Three questions present themselves immediately to the curious reader: first, 
what is meant by a panpsychist metaphysics?  Second, what reasons are there 
for accepting such an account?  Third, why believe that such an account, if 
accepted, will have the power to effect change of the scope and scale needed to 
thwart ecological catastrophe?
The first question is perhaps easiest to answer, for Mathews’ own metaphysics 
has obvious affinities with the dual-aspect monisms of Fechner and Spinoza, 
for instance, and readers of this journal are doubtless familiar with Arne Naess’ 
interest in the latter particularly as a philosophical resource for Ecosophy.  
Mathews appears to have more familiarity with the work of Leibniz, but shuns 
his tendency toward atomism in favor of a holistic view of reality.  Her position 
is that mind and matter form a unity, that subjectivity is a fundamental, non-
reducible feature of reality, but that subjectivity cannot be ascribed to 
individual physical objects, even though it does belong to the material world at 
large.5  She contends that the acceptance of subjectivity as an inseparable 
aspect of materiality is the key to reanimating the universe.6  In the second 
chapter (“An Argument From Realism”) she describes subjectivity as a kind of 
“presence-to-itself” or “self-presence” of matter, and invites us to consider, by 
way of analogy, the way the sleeping body “occupies space from within as well 
as from without.”7  Her account of subjectivity is somewhat murky however, in 
that she denies that it need be accompanied by self-consciousness or even 
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sentience, and says “it is not necessarily identical with thoughts, feelings or 
sensations, but may be regarded as subtending them.”8  Again following 
Leibniz and Spinoza, she develops her view of an unconscious subjectivity in 
Chapter 3 (“The Way of the One and the Many”) along the lines of a conatus or 
impulsion toward self-realization, but crucially links this to orexis, which she 
depicts as the impulse to reach out to the world.  As she explains, “as long as 
an organism is hungry for contact with its world, it will seek to persevere in 
existence…desire can be construed as the urge to immerse self in world, to 
participate fully in the realness of the world.  Appetite, as an expression of 
desire, drives us not toward merely pleasure but towards connection.”9
I say this is a crucial link, because the memory of a connection between the 
fulfillment of human desire and the health of the ecosphere has been all but 
obliterated in our technology-intoxicated world.  From the blind striving of 
Schopenhauer’s Wille, to the cruel machinations of Nietzsche’s Wille zur Macht, 
to the infantilism of Freud’s libido, desire has been oft represented in modern 
philosophy as egocentric to the point of solipsism.  Small wonder then that 
consumer capitalism panders to what is self-absorbed in us rather than to what 
is other-directed, and smaller wonder still that such pandering has brought 
human history to the brink of biocide.  If there is to be any hope for a state of 
affairs such as that depicted in Naess’ description—following Kant—of a 
“beautiful act” (i.e., an act in which our spontaneous desire and our highest 
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moral calling coincide10), then the object of desire must be something more 
than to just use up the world in a consumptive mode.  Mathews’ account 
postulates something more, wherein “a mode of address, rather than of 
representation or explanation, is now required in our approach to reality, and 
such address should be integrated into all our social and personal practices…
from a panpsychist viewpoint, the aim is not to theorize the world, but to relate 
to it, and to rejoice in that relationship.”11  In short, she would have us 
rediscover eros as the leitmotiv of existence, and understand eros as the desire 
for meaningful encounter with the world.  This is argued at length in Chapter 4 
(“The Priority of Encounter Over Knowledge”), and takes us a long way toward 
answering the third question posed above, in that for Mathews, “the follower of 
the path of eros does find fulfillment through encounter, but in seeking others 
she is not seeking fulfillment—she is seeking them, and that is why her contact 
with them is fulfilling.”12  Eros, as the desire for intersubjective concourse with 
the world, presupposes panpsychism.13 Encountering other beings entails 
wanting to encounter them as they are, not as we wish them to be, and so 
entails solicitude for preserving their way of being—a sort of “built-in” 
environmental ethic thus emerges from a panpsychist metaphysics, according 
to Mathews.
It is the second question posed above that is the most difficult to answer in 
short order.  We can see already that there is a psychological argument for 
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panpsychism, in that a world composed of dead matter is incapable of 
responding to our deepest desires for connectivity and relatedness.  But how 
can we be reassured that accepting a panpsychist metaphysics is not mere 
wish-fulfillment, an attempt to veil the horrible, alienating truth about reality?  
Mathews offers two arguments in response to this, one metaphysical, the other 
epistemological.  Taken together she contends that they offer a compelling case 
for the view that, not only is panpsychism the world-view that harmonizes best 
with our deepest longings, it is also the world-view that has reason in its favor.
Mathews’ epistemological argument is heavily indebted to Berkeley for his 
critique of materialism as necessarily entailing skepticism about reality, though 
she rejects Berkeley’s idealism as a plausible solution.14  The problem is a 
familiar one to philosophers: if mind and matter are fundamentally different 
substances, how can we ever be sure that the mental lens through which we 
must regard materiality is not a distorting lens or reality even a mere 
projection?  Her solution, which she dubs the “argument from revelation,” is 
that we can be sure that there is a world out there not of our own construction 
or projection because we become aware of other viewpoints than our own, 
viewpoints that “break in” upon our own tendencies toward egocentrism and 
solipsism.15  No determined skeptic would be utterly confounded by this 
argument since even if it is successful the problems of one subject coming to 
know another may be as daunting as the problem of an immaterial mind 
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coming to know a material reality, but at least, Mathews contends, it is 
adequate to refute the skeptic’s doubt about there being a world out there to 
which subjectivity belongs and to which my subjectivity can relate.
Her metaphysical argument has both a negative and positive side to it.  On the 
negative side is the failure, to date at least, of materialist accounts to solve the 
so-called (by David Chalmers) “hard problem” of consciousness, which is the 
problem of how such apparently irreducible features of consciousness as 
intentionality (the fact that mental states are often “about” or refer to things 
other than what they themselves are) and qualia (first-person felt states, such 
as what it is “like” to feel pain or taste a banana) could possibly have emerged 
from material states that not only lack them but are defined in contradistinction 
to them.16  Her contention is that no account which excludes subjectivity from 
having fundamental ontological status can hope to reintroduce it later as an 
emergent quality or epiphenomenon.  The positive side is borrowed somewhat 
from Schopenhauer17 and in its barest essence is the claim that in order to even 
be able to conceive of a world to which I might possibly relate, I must recall that 
I too, along with my subjective awareness, am a part of this reality, not a 
detached spectator, and hence consistency demands that I suppose that reality, 
like me, has an inner life of its own and is not void of animation. 
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Though I can but offer the barest sketch of Mathews’ closely argued case here, I 
trust the power of her account is evident.  Particularly laudable is her 
observation that it begs the question to assume that our interactions/
encounters with the world distort or conceal more than they reveal.  While it is 
true that they may distort, it is not any less true to say that the world may only 
reveal some aspects of itself through encounter,18 a point made by other 
philosophers of encounter, such as Buber and Levinas, whom Mathews credits 
as influences.19  Also commendable is Mathews’ sensitivity to the problem of 
suffering, non-human and human alike, and the extent to which this presents 
an obstacle to affirming existence on its own terms.  She deals with this 
problem throughout Chapter 5 (“Suffering and the Tree of Life”), and her 
response to it is the most philosophically satisfying of which I am aware; that is, 
if panpsychism is correct, then the universe is implicated in whatever suffering 
individuals within it experience, but this is the necessary price to be paid for 
individuation and creativity.  She rightly notes that “only a Creator who actually 
suffers everything that its creatures suffer is truly above suspicion in this 
connection.  All other justifications for the fact of suffering smack of 
contrivance and rationalization.”20  As with Nietzsche, the question of how to 
affirm the world along with its suffering is a major preoccupation for Mathews, 
and also as with Nietzsche, even her best efforts at affirmation are tinged with 
ambivalence: 
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All that can be stated with any confidence is that the deep desire of 
the One for the Many that underlies the very self-realization of the 
One is inconsistent, ultimately, with the suffering of the Many, but 
that to actualize the order of intersubjectivity that constitutes the 
deepest potential of the One, the One needs our cooperation.21
If, as at least one psychologist has suggested, “the primary emotional work we 
need to do to deal with our inadequacy in the face of environmental destruction 
is the work of mourning,”22 then the adoption of a panpsychist perspective that 
casts the universal One in the role of fellow sufferer rather than spectator or 
indifferent cause may have therapeutic value in addition to philosophical 
credibility.
Mathews’ cure for our metaphysical repression is bold, at times dazzlingly so.  
Her case is not without its questionable aspects.  For instance she claims that 
her own view encompasses but surpasses deep ecological views in that it 
includes artifacts as well as naturally occurring entities in its scope, going so far 
as to include a car at one point as an example of the extent to which one can 
experience an encounter with an entity.23  Such metaphysical largesse may be 
required by Mathews’ contention that all matter, not just life, participates in 
subjectivity, but it seems to leave her position quite vulnerable to the “plastic 
trees” objection to environmental activism;24 that is, if artifacts have just as 
much standing with respect to subjectivity as organisms, then why privilege a 
putatively “natural” entity or habitat over a prosthetic one?  At the very least it 
raises what philosopher Elliot Sober has dubbed “the problem of 
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demarcation,”25 the problem of where to “draw the line” between what matters 
most ethically and what is of less importance, and may put Mathews’ position in 
closer proximity to that of a gospel of ecological invention such as that 
espoused by Frederick Turner26 than Mathews herself intended. Obviously 
readers will have to peruse Mathews’ arguments firsthand for a satisfying 
answer, and I heartily recommend they do so, for her book is an eminently 
worthwhile read.
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